





This paper defends and relates two forms of value holism: (1) that the
welfare value of a moment in one’s life depends on what happens at
other moments, and (2) that the contributory value of an adding an-
other life to the population depends on what other lives already exist.
In the first section, I bolster the standard normative arguments for
welfare holism by also exploring neglected empirical and metaphys-
ical considerations. In the second section, I offer a broad overview
of how value holists can escape Parfit’s ‘Repugnant Conclusion’, and
address the most powerful arguments commonly offered in support of
the alternative, ‘atomistic’, approach.
∗Thanks to Nick Beckstead, Dan Halliday, Peter Singer, Gerard Vong, and Helen Yetter
Chappell for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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How does the value of a whole (person, society) relate to the value of its
parts (timeslices, individuals)? Utilitarians have traditionally treated the
parts as axiologically fundamental, and held that we may simply sum the
intrinsic values of the parts to obtain the intrinsic value of the whole. But
this presupposes what we may call ‘value atomism’, or the claim that the
contributive value of a part depends only on its intrinsic (non-relational)
features. The value of a part is, in other words, taken to be independent
of what else exists. In this paper, I wish to challenge this ‘independence
assumption’, and explore the prospects for an holistic axiology that takes
extrinsic or relational properties into account. We may thus take value holism
to be the claim that the contributive value of a part cannot be assessed in
isolation; it depends on how the part stands in relation to the whole, and in
particular on what other parts there are. To speak even more generally: value
holists treat the whole as axiologically fundamental, and hold that parts get
their value in virtue of how they influence the ‘shape’ (so to speak) of the
whole. This rather abstract picture should become clearer when applied to
the particular examples discussed below.
The first section discusses holism as it applies within a life. I begin by
noting some intuitive cases of extrinsic or relational properties affecting the
value of our momentary experiences. I then discuss some surprising evidence
suggesting that additional moments of pain may be preferable to the immedi-
ate cessation of pain. This leads to a closer examination of hedonic duration,
or the sense of ‘duration’ that is relevant to the assessment of extended ex-
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periences as more or less pleasant. I offer a speculative reconceptualization
of hedonic duration that strikes an appropriate balance between subjectiv-
ity and objectivity, and which reinforces the holist’s idea that we cannot
determine the value of a momentary state of affairs in isolation.
The second section of this paper then applies value holism to the larger
question of how individual lives contribute to the value of the world as a
whole. This discussion focuses on a central problem of population ethics
known as ‘the repugnant conclusion’. I will suggest two distinctively ‘holistic’
solutions to the problem: the first taking the position that ‘mere addition’ —
adding intrinsically good lives to a world — may make the world worse,
and the second exploring the value of diversity. In each case, I argue that
the contributory value of a life cannot be assessed in isolation, but instead
depends on what else there is. I conclude by considering some objections to
this position.
1 Whole Lives and their Individual Moments
1.1 Directional Trends and Narrative Structure
We care about not only our net happiness but also its distribution. Better to
start miserable and die happy than the reverse, many of us would think. This
may be partly explicable through contrast effects: the order in which you eat
brussel sprouts and icecream may influence how tasty each seems individually,
i.e. changes in order might also lead to changes in intrinsic hedonic quality.
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Similarly, the memory of better days may render present drudgery all the
worse, and memories of past difficulties may sweeten today’s success. But
even if we correct for all of that, so that the momentary experiences are truly
identical in intrinsic hedonic quality, and differ only in order, we may still
prefer an upward trend in its own right (Velleman 1991). For in addition
to moment-to-moment experiences, many of us also care greatly about the
overall ‘narrative structure’ of our lives. We prefer to live out a story that
improves with time rather than declines. (As an extreme case, consider the —
perhaps apocryphal — tales of Japanese lovers who leap to their deaths mid-
coitus, so as to end their lives in bliss.)
Value holism has important implications for how we think about longevity
and life-extension. Paradigmatic atomistic views (e.g. classical utilitarian-
ism) imply that making a life n times longer also makes it n times better
(assuming the additional moments are intrinsically as good as the earlier
ones).1 But this seems implausible. A twenty-five year old should prefer dy-
ing at age 75 over an even gamble of either living to 125 or dying instantly.
This is not just a matter of risk aversion; rather, it seems that the latter
option has a lower expected value than the former. Living an extra hundred
1 Dan Halliday pointed out to me that not all atomists need think this. For example,
rather than summing the values of the parts, an atomist might obtain the value of the
whole by summing the square roots of the values of the parts. This would imply that it’s
better to spread some fixed amount of utility over more parts (i.e., a greater period of






x). An alternative atomistic view could model
the opposite pattern. But no such atomistic transformation escapes my basic objection:
that the significance and value of a good (e.g. having a child) cannot be determined in
isolation — it may depend, for example, on whether you have already achieved a like good
in the past.
Richard Yetter Chappell — Value Holism 5 of 30
years (even assuming perfect health, etc.) simply isn’t twice as good as liv-
ing an extra fifty. That’s not to say that life-span always has diminishing
marginal utility. If I am fated to die in one year, this might be too short a
time to achieve anything of great value. Twenty additional years of life would
plausibly be more than twenty times as valuable to me, if this would enable
such important goods as raising a family. I might reasonably risk instant
death for a chance < 1
20
of such life-extension. It all depends on what I most
want out of my life as a whole, and how long is necessary to achieve this.
So we cannot just assume that each additional century (say) adds as
much value to a life as the first. Even if the additional centuries are no
worse in themselves, they may be less important overall. Atomists cannot
accommodate this vital insight. Their axiological method is to define the
value of a life as a function of the values of its moments. But we have seen
that this approach is inadequate. We should thus prefer the holist’s axio-
logical method of directly evaluating the life as a whole. ‘Global’ preference
theories of wellbeing (such as Parfit’s success theory) exemplify this holistic
approach.2 Rather than assessing each moment in isolation, we can instead
ask ourselves, ‘How would I most like my life as a whole to go?’ Or: ‘What
is it that I most want in life?’ It is entirely possible that when we catego-
rize our global preferences or ‘life goals’ into those that could be achieved
2 Parfit (1984, Appendix I). This is in contrast with an atomistic ‘desire satisfactionist’
account, whereby we determine the value of each moment simply in virtue of the strength
and quantity of presently-held fulfilled desires, and then sum all these values to obtain the
value of the whole life.
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in a hundred years, and those that could only be achieved with a second
hundred, the former group will outweigh the latter. This would justify our
unwillingness to risk the former for an even chance at the latter. Even when
atomists can’t tell the difference, holism affords us the resources to recognize
that some years contribute more to our lives than others.
Common sense thus allows that extrinsic features may influence the mag-
nitude of the contributory value of some life experience. We might further
question whether even the valence of an experience (i.e. as good or bad) can
be determined in isolation (Dancy 2004; Kagan 1988; McNaughton 1988). An
intrinsically painful experience might be considered good rather than bad if
it is embedded within the right context, e.g., the strivings of a marathon
runner to stretch her endurance to its limits, or a repentant wrongdoer en-
during his just punishment. (A false memory causing the same subsequent
feelings of satisfaction would arguably not have the same value, at least if
we value the challenge — or the penance — itself.) When assessing their life
as a whole, an agent may reasonably judge a moment of pain to have been
non-instrumentally desirable, in light of its relations to other parts of their
life, and the elegance of the overall pattern this gives rise to. These examples
help to bring out the prima facie plausibility of value holism, and may even
convince some readers that they are implicitly committed to the view. But I
now want to consider the more surprising empirical phenomenon of ‘duration
neglect’.
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1.2 Preferring the Longer Pain
Kahneman et al. (2003) found that subjects sometimes prefer additional pain,
if the appended moments are less painful than what has gone before. In the
short episode, subjects are required to hold their hands in very cold water
for sixty seconds. In the longer version, this sixty seconds is followed by
an additional thirty seconds in which the water temperature gradually rises,
though it’s still unpleasantly cold. After experiencing both the short and
long episodes, and being offered a choice of which to repeat, most subjects
choose the long episode. More generally, the duration of an experience seems
to have little effect on our retrospective evaluations. Instead, these value
judgments are largely determined by some combination of the ‘peak’ and
‘end’ moments. Kahneman et al. consider these judgments erroneous on the
grounds that they violate temporal monotonicity, an independence rule to the
effect that “adding moments of pain to the end of an episode can only make
the episode worse.” (p.401) But perhaps we should instead reject temporal
monotonicity in favour of value holism. We should take subjects at their
word when they tell us that the added moments of lesser pain made their
overall experience better. Or so I will argue.
To begin, let us note the default presumption that each individual is the
best authority when it comes to determining the hedonic quality of their own
phenomenal experiences. To override this presumption, the atomist might
offer two arguments.3 First, they could point out that the subjects themselves
3 Versions of each can be found in Kahneman et al. (2003).
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would presumably want the pain to end sooner if offered the choice during
the episode. After all, it is in the nature of painful/aversive experience that
it be accompanied by a local preference for its own cessation. So at each
moment when we are experiencing pain, we wish it to stop. True enough.
Yet when making an overall judgment from ‘above the fray’, so to speak, the
subjects express a conflicting preference, and merely noting the conflict does
not tell us how to resolve it. As a general rule, we tend to privilege (reflective)
global preferences over (momentary) local ones: such a hierarchy is, after all,
essential for the exercise of self-control. So, again, some further reason is
required to override the presumption in favour of the subjects’ expressed
global preference.
Alternatively, the atomist may grant the authority of (informed) global
preferences, but suggest that subjects’ retrospective assessments here are ill-
informed. The lesser pain, being more recently experienced, is more salient
in their memory, so perhaps subjects misremember or fail to appreciate how
bad the initial period of pain really was. This is a difficult claim to assess.
There’s something dialectically suspicious about it, insofar as the claim is
wholly motivated by our prior reluctance to credit the substantive assessment
offered by the subjects, when the credibility of this assessment is precisely
the question under dispute. Independent evidence of error might be sought in
the fact that most subjects claimed that the longer trial caused “less overall
discomfort”, which Kahneman et al. (2003, p.403) insist is “simply wrong”.4
4 I should note that some subjects made more straightforward factual errors, but that
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But for this to qualify as independent evidence of factual error, we must as-
sume that subjects were interpreting ‘overall discomfort’ to mean ‘aggregate
momentary discomfort’. This seems unlikely. It’s far more plausible to think
that subjects were simply reiterating their holistic judgment that the longer
trial was less unpleasant on the whole. So these considerations leave us at a
dialectical impasse.
1.3 Subjective Time
So far, I have assumed that the third-personal perspective yields accurate
insights into the aggregate momentary qualities of experience. For example,
I have assumed (with Kahneman et al.) that an episode of pain that has
longer physical duration must thereby have longer experienced duration. But
this arguably presupposes a false picture of consciousness — what Dennett
(1991, p.107) calls ‘the Cartesian Theatre’, or a special place in the brain
“where the order of arrival equals the order of ‘presentation’ in experience
because what happens there is what you are conscious of.”
An important consequence of rejecting this picture of consciousness is
that our subjective experience of time may not match up with the objective
timeline. We experience the content of conscious representations, not the
vehicle doing the representing. It is tempting to assume that the temporal
representation in consciousness is somehow transparent — that if our brains
represent to us that A occurs before B, this must be because a vehicle repre-
still leaves many others whose preference for the longer pain is yet to be ‘debunked’.
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senting A was followed, in objective time, by a vehicle representing B. But of
course there is no logical reason why this must be so. As Dennett points out,
we can represent time using a medium other than time itself. We can say
“B occurs after A”, and it represents the ordering 〈A,B〉 even though the
sentence mentions them in the order 〈B,A〉. Similarly, you can subjectively
experience the represented order of events 〈A,B〉, even if the brain regions
doing the representing actually process the events in the opposite order. And
indeed several experiments have been conducted which demonstrate precisely
this effect, at least on very short time scales.5
At this point, one may worry that our understanding of phenomenal
consciousness has become too subjective. There is surely a difference between
actually experiencing some temporally extended episode and merely believing
(representing) this to be so. But can we maintain this distinction without
falling back on physical duration as our objective standard? To bring out
the problem, compare the following three ‘experience machines’:6
Machine A gives you pleasant experiences for 100 years.
Machine B (allegedly) gives you all the same experiences, feeling exactly
the same from the inside, but packed into just a single physical day.
Machine C gives you one day of pleasure, and then simply implants in you
the (presumably false) belief that it felt like it lasted for 100 years.
5 See Dennett (1991, p.143) on the ‘phi phenomenon’, ‘cutaneous rabbit’, etc.
6 Adapted from Ben Bradley and Troy Jollimore’s blog discussion at PEA
Soup: http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2008/02/objective-and-s.html#
comment-101237434
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The challenge is to make sense of how Machine B could be anything other
than a fanciful redescription of Machine C — which we don’t want to say
really gives us 100 years of experienced pleasure. The solution, I think, is
found by reflecting on the relative paucity of the C-implanted representation.
It’s one thing to write a story which says “100 years passed”, and quite
another to fill out the details for 100 years’ worth of fictional events. So, if
we think of Machine A as taking a long time to impart rich informational
content (lots of pleasure), and Machine C as taking a very short time to
impart a very thin representation (very little pleasure), the question whether
Machine B imparts a lot or only a little pleasure comes down to the richness of
the representations it implants. We can thus make the necessary distinctions
without appeal to the dubious notion of a ‘Cartesian Theater’ in our minds
where consciousness ‘occurs’.
This suggests that a fairly radical reconceptualization of hedonic value
may be in order. The spirit of hedonism seems more consonant with a concern
for subjectively experienced duration than mere physical time. But this
in turn is best analysed in terms of representational richness, or so I have
proposed. This may have significant practical implications — let me note
just two.
Firstly, evidence suggests that younger, inexperienced brains tend to lay
down denser and richer memories, explaining why time seems to pass more
quickly as we age (Stetson et al. 2007). So if my above claims are correct,
utilitarians should be disproportionately (relative to their merely physical du-
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ration) concerned to increase the hedonic quality of children’s experiences —
possibly counterbalancing our prior preference for a life that improves with
age.
Secondly, we may be led to the conclusion that repetitive experiences may
be discounted, if merely repeating the same old information over and over
again does nothing to enrich the representation. (Suppose all you need is a
ditto mark, or the cognitive equivalent of “times a million”.) For example, if
I am groggily experiencing a long, painful operation,7 it’s possible that after
a while the moments will begin to blur together, to the point where it makes
no subjective difference to me whether the operation lasts (say) two hours
or four. Of course, the mere retrospective inability to tell the two scenarios
apart does not by itself imply that there was no hedonic difference. But if
the intervening momentary experiences are indeed qualitatively indiscernible
in fact, and not broken up by any (perhaps later forgotten) distinguishing
features, then this provides some reason to think that we should count the
hedonic (dis)value as the same in either case. On the other hand, providing
a ‘signpost’ that dispels temporal blur may cause an experience to count for
a lot more.
I should emphasize that most of the time, even intrinsically identical pains
are embedded in discernibly different experiences (with different background
thoughts running through our heads, etc.), and so count as recognizably
distinct. But we can at least imagine a case where extending the duration
7 Compare the thought experiments in Parfit (1984, chapter 8).
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doesn’t introduce sufficient qualitative differences. After a while, many mo-
ments of hospitalized agony all blur together, and we may think the reason for
this is precisely that there is truly nothing in the experiences to distinguish
them. And so, on this account, they count for just one.
1.4 Taking Stock
I began this section by bringing out our implicit commitment to value holism
as it applies within an individual life. There are many plausible cases in which
it seems the value of a momentary experience cannot be assessed in isolation.
Then, by distinguishing physical and ‘subjective’ (or consciously represented)
time, I suggested, in addition, a metaphysical basis for something that closely
resembles holistic practice: for even insofar as the intrinsic qualities of ex-
perience are concerned, these may yet be underdetermined by a physical
moment in isolation, instead depending on physically later (or earlier) events
to precisify their phenomenal character. Developing this idea further, I of-
fered a speculative reconceptualization of hedonic evaluation, whereby the
‘duration’ dimension is replaced by an atemporal notion of ‘representational
richness’. This provided a reason to think that duplicate experiences may
count for only one, assuming that duplication may be represented cheaply.
In the following section, I will seek to establish some corresponding norma-
tive conclusions on the societal level, but without relying on such contentious
metaphysical assumptions.
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2 Whole Populations and Individual Lives
2.1 The Repugnant Conclusion
Derek Parfit (1984) famously observed that total utilitarianism implies the
‘Repugnant Conclusion’ that for any finite flourishing population A, we can
imagine some vastly larger population Z of lives barely worth living, which
ends up counting as “better”. This is partly because total utilitarianism is
an atomistic theory according to which the contributory value of a life is
simply its welfare value for the person living it — a value that can be deter-
mined in isolation, simply by looking at that life in itself. Since worthwhile
lives presumably have some positive contributory value, atomism implies that
astronomically more lives yield astronomically greater value. Yet when we
consider the imagined world Z as a whole, this conclusion no longer seems
plausible. Holistic judgment enables us to recognize the Repugnant Con-
clusion as repugnant; we may accordingly expect value holism to provide a
fruitful starting point in our search for a solution.
It is not easy to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, as Parfit’s ‘Mere Ad-
dition Paradox’ demonstrates.8 ‘Mere addition’ is when we add additional
lives — all above the baseline of lives worth living — to a world, without
affecting the prior inhabitants in any way. Parfit claims that this process can-
not make a world worse. This seems prima facie plausible: after all, where’s
the harm? How could it be bad to add intrinsically good lives, to no ill effect
8 Parfit (1984, chapter 19); see also Arrhenius (1999).
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for anyone else? This suggests the following principle:
Mere Addition: If the only difference between worlds A and
A+ is that the latter contains additional lives above the baseline,
then A+ is no worse than A.
Next, note that it can only improve a world to reduce inequality in such a
way as also increases total welfare, while holding all else equal. Call such a
shift ‘beneficial equality’. Beneficial equality licenses the move from A+
to a world B where the worse-off group in A+ is benefited more than the
well-off group is harmed by the shift. If B is better than A+, which in turn
is no worse than A, it follows — by transitivity — that B (a world of greater
total but lesser average utility) is likewise at least as good as A. We may
iterate this process until we reach the repugnant world Z, with astronomic
total utility but miniscule average utility.
These implications may lead us to examine the Mere Addition principle
more closely. Indeed, to a value holist, the justification for the principle
will seem immediately suspect, as it practically assumes atomism from the
start. Recall that the justification appeals to the idea that the contributory
disvalue of a life must be due to some badness in its intrinsic qualities: the
life must be bad in itself, in a way that lives above the baseline are not. But
this is just to assume atomism. To a holist there is nothing contradictory
about the idea that adding an intrinsically good part may make the whole
worse. (Laughter and merriment are good in themselves, but not at a funeral.
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Or, as Hurka (1983) suggests, adding mediocre paintings to a collection of
masterpieces may degrade the collection as a whole.) So while mere addition
may sound harmless enough, the real test is to directly evaluate the two
worlds in question. And here is it entirely open to us to judge that A+ is
indeed a worse world than A. Why might we think this? Well, for one thing,
the addition of worse (though not bad) lives alters the shape of the world
as a whole, and not for the better. Whereas before we had a world full of
flourishing, we now find mediocre lives in addition. That’s not to say that the
mediocre lives are bad in themselves, or considered in isolation. But given
how the rest of the world is, their addition may be considered undesirable
nonetheless.
None of this is to endorse anything so crude as the ‘average utilitarian’
principle that it’s always bad to lower average welfare. A world sparsely
populated with only a hundred people, however well-off they might be, would
plausibly be improved by adding more good lives, even if they are not as good
as those already there. For one thing, a world that’s too sparsely populated
can be expected to lack the full range of diversity that makes a (typical)
larger population so desirable. But note that diversity is a distinctively
holistic value: whether a particular life or experience adds to the diversity of
the whole depends on what else there is.
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2.2 Duplication and Holism
The Repugnant Conclusion brings to mind dystopian visions of a universe (Z)
tiled with bland mediocrity — the same old “muzak and potatoes” (Parfit
2004), repeated over and over. This is certainly a dreary scenario. Muzak
and potatoes were never all that great to begin with, but to simply add more
of the same is arguably not to add any more value to the world whatsoever.
It would be different if we were to instead imagine a world Z* of very diffuse
and diverse excellences, where each life contained only modest value when
considered in isolation, but nonetheless offered a distinctive contribution to
the world as a whole. This no longer seems so repugnant at all; it may even be
an open question whether, intuitively, it would be better to condense those
diffuse glimpses of excellence into a smaller number of more consistently
flourishing lives. The holist may go either way on this question, so I will not
attempt to settle it here. What I want to highlight instead is the intuitive
significance of diversity. What seems most repugnant about the Repugnant
Conclusion (as envisioned above) is not just that value is so diffuse, but that
there doesn’t really seem to be much value in the Z-world at all. We’re
inclined to think that contributory value just can’t be duplicated in this way.
Rather, to make the world as a whole more valuable, we must add lives
of distinctive value. So claims the ‘diversity principle’ that I now wish to
consider.
DP: Multiple evaluands count for less the less distinct they are.
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A fully fleshed-out version of this principle would need to specify what qual-
itative dimensions count as introducing a normatively relevant ‘difference’.
For example, diversity of lifestyles and fundamental goals seems more norma-
tively significant than diversity of spatial location or hair colour. As I don’t
have space to develop the details here, I will simply assume that the reader
shares with me a rough sense of what dimensions seem relevant. Even this
rough of a grasp of the principle suffices to allow some initial observations
and assessments.
However it may be fleshed out, DP has a number of significant implica-
tions. We’ve already seen how it can explain the problem with (the most
repugnant version of) the Repugnant Conclusion.9 For another example: if
DP were false, then it would be of momentous importance whether ours was
a world of Nietzschean ‘eternal recurrence’. So those of us skeptical about
whether this would really matter so much must be relying on some DP-like
holistic principle for discounting all those duplicate epochs. For a more prac-
tical example: suppose it turns out that the experiences of most hens in
factory farms are qualitatively identical (or nearly so).10 DP would then im-
ply that the total disvalue here is less than we might at first expect, since
the duplicates are subject to discounting. This would be a very surprising,
and somewhat disconcerting, result.
9 Though it’s worth noting that it suggests a new objection to the mere addition
paradox: the ‘beneficial equality’ step may actually be for the worse if it reduces diversity.
10 I owe this example to Michael Vassar.
Richard Yetter Chappell — Value Holism 19 of 30
This may be turned into an objection: it seems absurd to think that
it might make the world no worse were a billion people tortured instead of
just one, for example.11 But such intuitions gain their force from ‘ordinary’
cases, where different people have different memories, etc., and which thus
involve discernibly different experiential contexts. (This background assump-
tion of human cognitive diversity may be at least part of the explanation why
this objection seems so much more gripping when applied to humans than
hens. The logic of atomism should apply equally to either case, by contrast.)
Special care is required to conceive of a situation where DP would actually
apply — e.g. a dystopian ‘farm’ of duplicate brains-in-vats, programmed to
have exactly the same series of experiences throughout their existence — but
then the intuition is less clear. To ensure that all variables are controlled,
imagine a ‘digital person’ or conscious Artificial Intelligence, whose ‘life’ is
constituted by the running of a computer program. Would it matter how
many duplicate copies of the program were run? It isn’t obvious. Suppose
that, as a digital person, you are about to undergo copying (digital ‘fission’),
but that not all of your future continuants will be identical. If there were to
be 95 copies of one programmed future, and just one copy each of five other,
qualitatively distinct futures, would you rather improve the first program or
the other five? The latter preference would indicate a strong commitment to
DP.
11 Or, as Bostrom (2006, p.188) puts it: “It would... be odd to suppose that whether
one’s own brain produces [morally relevant] phenomenal experience strongly depends on
the happenings in other brains that may exist in faraway galaxies...”
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Clear intuitions are difficult to come by in these cases, so we may prefer
to decide the issue on more general theoretical grounds. The first section
of this paper noted that we care about the shape of our life as a whole. A
stronger claim is that this is all that matters. Mere multiplication — say
where every event extends for twice as long — would then be dismissed as
lacking in normative significance, so long as the broad contours of the life
remained much the same. The value of an extra year of life depends on what
would be achieved with it, and whether it would contribute anything new or
significant to the overall structure of the life. If it is all much of a sameness
with what has gone before, it may not have any significant impact on the
quality of the life taken as a whole. And the same may be true of the relation
between individual lives and the value of the world as a whole.
This general holistic picture may cast some doubt on the importance of
absolute quantities of mere duplicates. But it doesn’t immediately follow
that all that matters is the number of distinct evaluands. We may also care
about their proportions, or the relative quantities of each duplicated kind.
For example, in the case of digital fission, perhaps I should care more about
the future that occurs in 95% of instances, even if I shouldn’t care whether
the absolute number of instances is 100 or 1000. This is another issue on
which the holist could go either way; I won’t attempt to settle the matter
here.
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2.3 The Alleged Asymmetry
Some claim that there is an important asymmetry in our assessments of
merely possible pleasures and pains (or goods vs. bads more generally). They
claim that we have little or no reason to bring more good lives into existence,
or to regret their absence, whereas we do have (significant) reason to prevent
lives of suffering and to feel relief at their absence.12 For example, we feel
that a ‘package deal’ containing several additional good lives and one bad
life would thereby be a bad deal. As Christopher Belshaw (2007) writes, “We
can’t justify starting this bad life by appeal to the good in other, separate,
lives.” But I propose that we can explain away such intuitions by appeal to
value holism.
According to value holism, the value of the above ‘package deal’ is not
independent of what else exists. It might be positive in some circumstances
and negative in others, depending on how it impacts the overall ‘shape’ of
the world. As it happens, we have a high normal baseline: we assume that
most lives in our society are pretty good. So, creating a good life is nothing
exceptionally good, whereas creating a bad life is exceptionally bad. Given
the more fundamental principle that exceptionally good or bad actions have
greater moral significance (in virtue of their impact on the general shape or
form of society), we find that a contingent asymmetry in social circumstances
leads to the above moral asymmetry.
Note that things could have been different. If we imagine a dystopian
12 See, e.g., Benatar (2006, p.30); Parfit (1984, p.391).
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world where the normal ‘baseline’ is much lower — i.e., where most lives
are rather awful — then it seems to me that the moral asymmetry would
be likewise inverted. Given the opportunity to bring about an exceptionally
good life, people ought to do so. To prevent another typically bad one would
be permissible — good, even — but not required. So, dystopians ought to
embrace the package deal of good and bad lives.
On the view I’ve outlined, there is no fundamental moral asymmetry in
the relative weighting of good and bad additional lives. Any asymmetry here
instead arises from the application of value holism to our particular circum-
stances. We may be right to think that we shouldn’t want six additional good
lives at the cost of an additional bad one, in our current circumstances. But
this does not imply that more good lives couldn’t — in other circumstances —
outweigh bad ones so as to make a world better on net.
Some have proposed a more plausibly fundamental asymmetry: although
additional good lives may make a world non-instrumentally worse (if they
reduce the average welfare, say), additional bad lives cannot make a world
non-instrumentally better (even if they are less bad than average). I think
it’s open to a holist to reject this assumption. But even if we don’t go quite
that far, Huemer (2008) proves that assigning any non-zero weight to average
utility commits us to:
The Sadistic Conclusion: In some circumstances, it would be
better with respect to utility to add some unhappy people to the
world (people with negative utility), rather than creating a larger
Richard Yetter Chappell — Value Holism 23 of 30
number of happy people (people with positive utility).
This does seem counterintuitive, at least at first glance. But further reflection
reveals that it is not much of a move from the claim that adding mediocre
lives can make a world worse. For then we may expect that adding a great
many mediocre lives could make a world much worse (transforming it from a
predominantly flourishing world to a predominantly mediocre one). If this is
a harm at all, then it isn’t surprising that it could outweigh the modest harm
of adding a single moderately bad life. We are tempted to draw a bright line
between lives that are worth living and those that aren’t, but the absolute
difference in utility might be as small as you care to imagine (for arbitrarily
small ε, compare the welfare values +ε/2 and −ε/2). So we should not place
as much weight on this difference as is relied upon in the above objection.13
2.4 Wrapping Up
While my first section explored the application of value holism within a life,
this second section has explored how a holistic view might be applied to
some of the central problems of population ethics. Value holism naturally
suggests two routes to avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion: the first by re-
jecting Mere Addition, and the second by rejecting any duplication that may
sneak in during the ‘beneficial equalizing’ step. (The latter leaves open a
diversified version of the repugnant conclusion, but then it no longer seems
13 Arrhenius (1999) similarly relies on the ‘Non-Sadism Condition’ that any number
of happy lives cannot be worse than any number of unhappy lives. Despite the forceful
name, I think that value holists should feel quite comfortable in rejecting this principle.
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so repugnant.) The preceding sub-section addressed some objections that are
based upon alleged asymmetries between harms and benefits. I now want to
wrap up by drawing out what I consider the two most pressing challenges
that emerge from all this.
First, there is the question whether atomists can make a principled stand
in defence of Mere Addition. Huemer suggests the following “almost irre-
sistable” principle:14
Modal Pareto Principle: For any possible worlds x and y, if,
from the standpoint of self-interest, x would rationally be pre-
ferred to y by every being who would exist in either x or y, then
x is better than y with respect to utility.
As before, this principle is clearly atomistic: it considers each life in isolation
(“from the standpoint of self-interest”), and leaves no room for holistic ‘big
picture’ considerations. But this can be defended by appeal to an indepen-
dently appealing conception of ethics as fundamentally person-centered. It
is tempting to think that in order for something to be bad, it must be bad
for someone (cf. Parfit 1984, p.395). We may further think that our rea-
son to avoid a bad outcome is fundamentally second-personal, in the sense
that it stems from the normative authority of the individual(s) who would
be harmed (Darwall 2006). On this view, moral agents aim simply to act in
14 Huemer (2008, p.903). This supports what Huemer calls “Benign Addition” — just
like Mere Addition except that the original inhabitants of world A are very slightly better
off in A+. (The new additions to A+ are, as before, (barely) happy to be alive, and so
also prefer A+ to A.)
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ways that are justifiable to others, without any ambition to promote imper-
sonal value or make things better from ‘the point of view of the universe’.
(The universe has no point of view, and if it did we would have no reason to
care about it, or so the thought goes.) Call this view personalism.
Now, personalists might accept holism within an individual life, since
they accept that — morally speaking — the whole person is ‘prior’ to their
temporal parts. Value inheres in people first, and their momentary stages
only derivatively. But the personalist will reject my extension of holism to
the interpersonal level. They deny that there is any supra-personal collective
entity (even ‘the world’ as a whole) that can serve as an independent value-
bearer or source of normatively authoritative reasons. Whereas the holist
talks seriously about making the world a better place, personalists will insist
that this is merely shorthand for making the individual people in the world
better off. (Compare Frankena’s maxim that “Morality is made for man, not
man for morality.”)15
Such a view has significant traction in the western cultural tradition. But
even total utilitarians must ultimately reject it, for reasons that emerge from
Parfit’s work on the ‘non-identity problem’ (1984, chapter 16). Suppose that
we have an opportunity to bring about world Z, but choose to stick with
world A instead. Looking back, the total utilitarian will judge that we chose
wrongly. But who or what has been ‘wronged’ or harmed by our choice? The
15 Frankena (1973, p.116). Note that Frankena wasn’t talking about this particular
issue; but it’s a suggestive turn of phrase all the same.
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only available answer, I want to suggest, is ‘the world as a whole’. After all,
they can’t very well insist that we should have brought about world Z for the
sake of those merely possible people who will now never get to exist. Only
existent beings can make claims on us, so there are no second-personal reasons
to bring about world Z. In particular, there is nobody who could complain
of being harmed, mistreated, or disrespected by our failure to bring Z about.
This is not to deny that we may have reason to bring people into existence,
or to lament our past failure to do so. But it would be nonsensical to say
that the non-existent people are themselves the source of the reason. There
are no such people.16 So if we want to say that there are reasons in this case,
we are forced to go beyond personalism. The reasons that we have in these
cases will be impersonal reasons — which opens the door to holism.
Despite being forced to reject personalism, the total utilitarian may rea-
sonably insist that there’s an important sense in which (on their view) the
intrinsic value of the additional possible lives is what ‘gives us reason’ — or
explains our duty — to bring about their existence.17 After all, utilitarian-
ism is a form of welfarism: the axiological view that what’s good is just
16 One may object that the people would exist if we acted rightly. So in that case, at
least, the total utilitarian could point to these existing people as the reason why the act
was right. But this is insufficient, for we need an explanation that will also carry over
to the case in which we fail to act rightly — in which case there do not exist any such
additional people to ground the claim that it was wrong of us not to bring them into
existence. Hence the moral claim must stem from some other source.
17 That’s slightly sloppy wording, however. We arguably can’t refer to the imagined
‘additional people’ individually, if they don’t exist and so have no particular identities.
To speak more carefully, what gives us reason here is the fact that the imagined outcome
would contain x many additional happy people. This makes it clearer that we’re talking
about (a property of) the world, and not about any particular individuals in it.
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the welfare of sentient beings. But this should not lead us into metaphysical
confusion. In particular, even if we have a duty to procreate so as to bring
about more good lives — lives that will be good for the people living them —
this is not to say that we have a duty to those non-existent people. (Again,
there are no such people to whom we might be duty-bound, in the case where
we fail to procreate.) Rather, such loose talk merely serves to specify the
content of the obligation, not its source. So the utilitarian may certainly hold
that an additional good life would be intrinsically good, and indeed that the
right-making feature of the procreative choice is precisely the welfare value
of the resulting life: the value it would have for the person living it. But
this first-order moral claim about what we have reason to choose (and why)
must be distinguished from metaphysical claims about the source or nature
of the reason. In this case, the reason must be impersonal in nature, even if
welfarist in content. And since welfarism is just another first-order axiolog-
ical theory rivaling value holism, it cannot provide independent support for
the Modal Pareto Principle, the way that personalism might have.
To wrap up the point: It may be thought impersonally desirable that the
world should contain more happy people — in which case we may reasonably
lament that this isn’t so. We may regret that the world is worse than it
could have been. But we cannot sensibly think that non-existent individuals
are worse-off than they might have been. Though our world is worse, it is
not worse for them (or, perhaps, anyone). This means that defenders of the
repugnant conclusion cannot appeal to personalism, and so their atomistic
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Modal Pareto Principle lacks independent support after all.
A second — more methodological — challenge may be suggested by the
various unresolved questions I’ve raised about how to best flesh out the holis-
tic position. Rejecting atomism opens up a number of new variables, and the
sheer range of options here may raise concerns about ‘curve-fitting’. Tailor-
ing the view to accommodate our intuitions in particular cases may just seem
less ‘principled’, somehow, than the atomist’s bullet-biting resolve. I think
that can’t be right quite as stated: the method of reflective equilibrium li-
censes moving back and forth between our judgments of particular cases and
general principles, as we seek to bring them all into coherence (Daniels 2008).
But the atomist might at least note that their theory has an advantage in
terms of simplicity. The question is whether it is too simple in its neglect of
the ‘big picture’ relations between lives.
Richard Yetter Chappell — Value Holism 29 of 30
References
Arrhenius, Gustaf. 1999. “An Impossibility Theorem In Population Axiol-
ogy With Weak Ordering Assumptions.” In Rysiek Sliwinski (ed.), Philo-
sophical crumbs. Essays dedicated to Ann-Mari Henschen-Dahlquist on the
occasion of her seventy-fifth birthday, volume 49 of Uppsala Philosophical
Studies, 11–21. Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
Belshaw, Christopher. 2007. “Review of David Benatar, ‘Better Never to
Have Been’.” URL: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=9983.
Benatar, David. 2006. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming
into Existence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bostrom, Nick. 2006. “Quantity of experience: brain-duplication and degrees
of consciousness.” Mind and Machines 16:185–200.
Dancy, Jonathan. 2004. Ethics Without Principles. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Daniels, Norman. 2008. “Reflective Equilibrium.” In Edward N.
Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2008 edi-
tion. URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/reflective-
equilibrium/.
Darwall, Stephen. 2006. The Second-Person Standpoint. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Dennett, Daniel. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and
Co.
Frankena, William. 1973. Ethics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2nd
edition.
Huemer, Michael. 2008. “In Defence of Repugnance.” Mind 117:899–933.
Hurka, Thomas. 1983. “Value and Population Size.” Ethics 93:496–507.
Kagan, Shelly. 1988. “The Additive Fallacy.” Ethics 98:5–31.
Kahneman, Daniel, Fredrickson, Barbara L., Schreiber, Charles A., and Re-
delmeier, Donald A. 2003. “When More Pain is Preferred to Less: Adding
a Better End.” Psychological Science 4:401–5.
Richard Yetter Chappell — Value Holism 30 of 30
McNaughton, David. 1988. Moral Vision. New York: Basil Blackwell.
Moore, G.E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—. 2004. “Overpopulation and the Quality of Life.” In Torbjörn Tännsjö and
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